I address the problem of whether philosophy can be international by its claim to represent rationality, hence universality. I argue in favor of this claim by focusing on the special logic thesis in Chinese philosophy. This thesis holds that a different type of logic must be used when studying the Chinese texts. I argue at length against the special logic thesis by examining the problem of human nature in the Confucian philosophers Mencius, Hsün Tzu and Kao Tzu. I show how (...) their arguments can be reconstructed as inductive analogical arguments and as deductive argument. I then broaden the notion of the logic of argumentation into a discussion of metaphysical anti‐essentialism and underdetermination in order to resolve the problem of human nature and also to show how the same types of logical analysis (more generally construed) can be applied to the arguments from these Confucian philosophers. Under my treatment, Kao Tzu, somewhat surprisingly, turns out to provide the most insight. (shrink)

One of the central problems arising from just the descriptive aspect of Kuhn's theory of scientific development by revolutions concerns the problem of generality. Is Kuhn's theory general enough to encompass the development of all the sciences, including both the natural sciences and the social sciences? The answer to this question is no. It is argued that this negative answer is due not to the nature of the sciences themselves but to the nature of Kuhn's theory and, in particular, its (...) local and reductionistic perspective. First steps toward the construction of a more global and more pluralistic descriptive theory of scientific development are taken. The development of significant episodes in the history of sciences other than physics and chemistry are considered. The immediate goals are to correct the narrow base from which Kuhn starts, to show how some of his basic ideas might be preserved, and to indicate how a theory of types would proceed. (shrink)

Can there be scientific theories in psychology, medicine or psychiatry? I approach this question through an in-depth analysis of a typical experiment for clinical depression involving the monoamine hypothesis, drug action, and placebos. I begin my discussion with a reconstruction of Adolph Grünbaum's conceptual analysis of 'placebo,' and then use his notion of "intentional placebo" to discuss a typical experiment using the monoamine hypothesis, two drugs and a placebo. I focus on the theoretical aspects of the experiment, especially on the (...) notion of causal explanation. I then raise five conceptual and methodological problems for theory construction. These problems focus on questions of the causal efficacy of placebos and drugs; ad hoc versus ceteris paribus explanations in biomedicine and psychology; and the falsifiability of the monoamine hypothesis. I conclude by pointing out the need for further, rigorous philosophical analysis concerning the possibility of theory construction in psychology, medicine, or psychiatry. (shrink)